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14 JUL 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director/Intelligence

**SUBJECT: Basis for Derivation of Soviet Submarine
Order of Battle and Production.**

In response to your request, the attached paper, prepared jointly by Office of Research and Reports and Office of Current Intelligence, provides a brief outline of the basis for Soviet Submarine Order of Battle and Production Estimates.

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OTTO E. GUTHE
Assistant Director
Research and Reports

Attachment

**Basis for Derivation of Soviet
Submarine Order of Battle
and Production**

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9 July 1957

**BASIS FOR DERIVATION OF SOVIET SUBMARINE ORDER OF BATTLE
AND PRODUCTION**

1. The Office of Naval Intelligence publishes order of battle in three versions, TOP SECRET CODEWORD, TOP SECRET, and SECRET. The SECRET order of battle is the source employed to compile the "Black Books" within CIA. Variations between the information at SECRET and CODEWORD levels are significant in details but the totals vary only slightly.

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& NSA

TOP SECRET EIDER

2. This method of computing the order of battle of the Soviet submarine force permitted a thorough reappraisal in 1954. A large number of boats that had been included in the order of battle were dropped from the total because of tenuous evidence. This reappraisal resulted in an estimate of 360 submarines on 1 January 1955.

This order of battle estimate can be brought up to date by including estimates of production as follows:

Number of submarines as of 1 Jan 55	360
plus: Production for 1955	83
Production for 1956	92
less: Retirements for 1955* (Implied)	18
Retirements for 1956*	19

Number of submarines as of 1 Jan 57 498

ONI and ORR/CIA agree that, of the total of 498 submarines for 1 January 1957, 442 are considered to be assigned to fleets; the remaining 56 were in pre-fleet-acceptance status. These submarines are estimated as constructed but in varying stages of final outfitting, trials, shakedown cruises, and possibly in transit to fleet assignment. The time required for acceptance varies with the success of the trials, the geographic location of the building yard and the time of year. For example, a submarine completed in October at the Krasnoye Sormovo shipyard in Gor'kiy and moved to Baku

* A submarine that becomes 14 years of age is categorized as obsolescent, and when it becomes 20 years old it is placed in an inactive status or dropped from the order of battle unless information is available to indicate that the unit is still operational.

in the Caspian Sea for final fitting-out, trials, and the like, may not reach its fleet destination, usually the Northern Sea Fleet, until late May or June of the following year because of frozen inland waterways. Submarines built in other areas may require less time. Additions to the fleets lag production from two to eight months.

Because of Soviet internal security measures, precise determination of submarine production is not possible; however, submarine production estimates are believed to be the best of any of the broad classes of military end items. Production estimates for the past several years have been coordinated with the Office of Naval Intelligence. Moreover, these

5. A correlation of [REDACTED] information including order of battle, together with a knowledge of Soviet techniques used in submarine construction provide the basis for estimating.* There are 5 known Soviet shipyards currently producing submarines. The relative importance of each of the yards and the type of information used in estimates are given in the following tabulation:

* ORR publications CIA/SC/RR 127, Estimated Production of Submarines in the USSR During 1950-55 and Soviet Capability for the Production of Submarines in 1957, 28 December 1955, TOP SECRET [REDACTED] and CIA/SC/RR 173, Correlation and Analysis of Data for Estimating Production of Submarines by the Krasnoye Sormovo Shipyard No. 112 in Gor'kiy, USSR 1955-56, 18 June 1957, TOP SECRET [REDACTED] are good examples of the involved methodology employed in estimating submarine production.

6. Continuing study of construction techniques has permitted an evaluation of Soviet capabilities. Estimates of production, derived from all other sources, are weighed against capability estimates to test the accuracy of such estimates.

- 4 -